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[L. A. No. 29051. In Bank. June 16, 1967.] 
Estate of EV A BARCLAY TAYLOR, Deceased. HAROLD 
JAMES DUERDEN, Individually and as Executor, etc., 
et al., Petitioners and Appellants, v. GENEVIEVE C. 
COONEY, Individually and as Administratrix Vlith the 
Will Annexed, etc., Objector and Appellant; ROSE-
MARY LICK, Objector and Respondent. 
[1] Decedents' Estates-Distribution-Trial, Evidence.-The trial 
court's finding that the executor's overall delay in settling a 
testator's estate was unreasonable, and that the estate should 
have been distributed before the death, on March 15, 1965, of 
a beneficiary to whom one-third of the residue was to go if she 
survived distribution, was supported by evidence that letters 
testamentary were issued in December 1963, that the executor 
was an alternate beneficiary if she failed so to survive, and 
that his belated- and unnecessary decision to sell securities 
delayed the petition for final distribution until March 4, 1965, 
despite his knowledge that she was ill, without funds and 
had asked him to expedite distribution, and despite the facts 
that the estate had the cash to pay inheritance taxes and that 
distribution could have been made in 1964. . 
[2a, 2b] Wills-Interest Passing-Time to Which Contingency Is 
Referable-When Distribution Unreasonably Delayed: Death 
of Taker Before Happening of Contingency.-In accordance 
with Prob. Code, § 142, relating to testamentary conditions 
precedent, and with the established policy favoring prompt 
distribution of estates, and the absence of any indication of a 
contrary intent by the testator, vesting of contingent interests 
under a will cannot be postponed by unreasonable delay in 
preparing the estate for distribution, and such interests vest 
at the time distribution should have been made, cutting off not 
only any alternate interest the executor may have had in such 
property but also that of any other alternate beneficiary. 
[8] Decedents' Estates-Distribution-Preliminary Distribution-
Effect of Failure to Seek: Wills-Interest Passing-Contin-
gent Gift.-A beneficiary, to whom one-third of the residue of 
a will was to go if she survived distribution, was under no 
obligation to petition for a preliminary distribution, and her 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Wills, § 337 et seq; Am. Jur. , Wills (1st ed 
§ 1251 et seq). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 988; [2] Wills, 
§§ 383, 384; [3] Decedents' Estates, § 994; Wills, § 380; [4, 5] 
Decedents' Estates, § 225; [6] Decedents' Estates, § 217. 
I 
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failure to do so, before she died just prior to the hearing of 
the petition for final distribution, did not and could not consti-
tute a forfeiture of her interest, where such interest had 
already vested by virtue of the executor's unreasonable delay 
in the distribution of the estate. 
[4a, 4b] Id.-Executors-Extra Compensation.-In the adminis-
tration of a decedent's estate, the trial court, at the contested 
hearing of the petition for final distribution, did not err in 
awarding extraordinary fees of $1,000 to the executor and 
$1,000 to his attorneys, where it was undisputed that they had 
performed extraordinary services as defined in Probe Code, 
§ 902, and where the record showed no abuse of discretion in 
fixing the fees. 
[6] Id. - Executors - Extra Compensation. - Compensation for 
extraordinary services awarded to executors of wills and their 
attorneys must be upheld on appeal unless they so clearly 
appear to be out of proportion to the value of the services 
performed as to establish an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court. 
[6] Id.-Compensation of Executors-Forfeiture.-Delay in set-
tling an estate is not a ground for denying executors' and 
administrators' fees otherwise justified by the services 
rendered. 
APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County distributing a portion of the residue of an 
estate and allowing extraordinary fees to the executor and his 
attorneys. Arthur K~ Marshall, Judge. Affirmed. 
K. S. Burns for Petitioners and Appellants. 
Norman Elliott as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners 
and Appellants. 
Richard A. Perkins for Objector and Appellant and for Ob-
jector and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J. - Eva Barclay Taylor died testate 
September 14, 1963. Her will provided that one-third of the 
residue of her estate should go to Ellen Catherine Glasky if 
she survived distribution of the estate. If she predeceased 
. distribution, her one-third share was to go in equal shares to 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 889; Am. 
Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 529. 
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Harold James Duerden and William Henry Duerden, J r.1 
The will was admitted to probate on November 26, 1963, and 
letters testamentary were issued to Harold, the executor of the 
estate, on December 2, 1963. The petition for final distribution 
was filed March 4, 1965, requesting that one-third of the resi-
due of the estate be distributed to Ellen. Hearing on the 
petition was set for March 29, 1965. Ellen died March 15, 
1965. Harold then filed another petition for final distribution 
requesting that the one-third share bequeathed to Ellen be 
distributed to him and William. Objections to the petition 
were filed by Genevieve C. Cooney, administratrix with the 
will annexed of Ellen's estate and a legatee under Ellen's 
will, and by Rosemary Lick, also a legatee under Ellen's will. 
The court sustained the objections to the petition for final 
distribution and decreed that Ellen's interest vested in her 
before her death. The court found that the estate could have 
been distributed in September of 1964 and should have been 
distributed before the death of Ellen in March of. 1965. It 
ordered distribution of Ellen's share to Miss Cooney as 
administratrix of Ellen's estate. It also awarded extraordi-
nary fees to the executor and attorney for the estate. Harold 
and William Duerden appeal from the part of the order 
distributing Ellen's share to Miss Cooney. Miss Cooney 
appeals from the part of the order awarding extraordinary 
fees. 
[1] The evidence supports the findings of the trial court. 
There was evidence that the executor, Harold, knew that 
Ellen was ill and without funds; that she requested him to 
expedite proceedings concerning distribution of the estate; 
that inheritance taxes could have been approximately com-
puted; that there was sufficient cash in the estate to pay any 
such taxes; and that it was therefore unnecessary to sell many 
of the securities that were sold. The sales that were made, 
whether necessary or not, could reasonably have been made at 
an earlier date, and Harold's attorney testified that many of 
the securities in the estate could have been distributed with-
out being sold, but that she "didn't think of" this possi-
bility. But for the belated decision to sell securities in the fall 
of 1964, the estate could easily have been distributed in that 
IThe will provides: "In the event the said Ellen Catherine Glasky pre-
deceases me, or predeceases the distribution of my estate, the share of 
my estate which she would have taken by this Article of my Will but for 
her death, shall go and be given in equal shares to HAROLD JAKES 
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year. The trial court was therefore justified in concluding 
that the overall delay was unreasonable and in finding that 
the estate should have been distributed before Ellen's 
death. 
[23] Based on this finding, the court applied the rule that 
vesting cannot be postponed by unreasonable delay in prepar-
ing an estate for distribution and that when there is such 
delay contingent interests vest at the time distribution should 
have been made. (See 5 Page, Wills (Bowe-Parker Revision 
1962) § 43.11, p. 367.) We have found no case that considers 
whether this rule is applicable in this state. The Duerdens 
contend that the rule is inconsistent with Probate Code sec-
tion 142. That section provides: "A condition precedent in a 
will is one which is required to be fulfilled before a particular 
disposition takes effect. It is to be deemed performed when the 
testator's intention has been substantially, though not liter-
ally, complied with. Nothing vests until such condition is ful. 
filled, except where fulfillment is impossible. . . ." ThE 
crucial issue under this section is whether a clause requiring 
survivorship should be interpreted to mean survivorship tc 
distribution or survivorship to the time distribution shoulc 
have occurred, or, as an alternative, whether survivor~hip t( 
the· e~rlier date constitutes substantial compliance with th. 
condition. Under either interpretation we believe that unrea 
son able delay cannot defeat the beneficiary's interest. Thi 
conclusion promotes the established policy favoring promp 
distribution of estates (see Estate of Hagemann, 63 Ca1.2. 
131, 136 [45 Cal.Rptr. 149, 403 P.2d 405] ; Estate of Toler, 4 
Cal.2d 460, 467, 469 [319 P.2d 337]) and carries out the prE 
surned intent of the testatrix. In the absence of any indicatio 
to the contrary a testator contemplates prompt distributiOl 
His intention is substantially complied with if a beneficiar 
who is alive at the time distribution could and should ha~ 
occurred is allowed to take under the will.2 (See Civ. Cod 
§ 3529.) 
2'fhe same policy reasons that lead us to conclude that the gift to Ell 
cannot be defeated by unreasonable delay in distribution compel t 
conclusion that Probate Code section 1023 does not make void the orG 
distributing Ellen's gift to the administratrix of her estate. The seco 
paragraph of that section provides that: "In the event any heir, devit 
or legatee so dying before distribution is named in any decree of d 
tribution heretofore or hereafter entered, purporting to make distril 
tion to such distributee by name, Much decree shall not be deemed Vt 
but shall have the same effect all though such distribution had been mf . 
to him while living. However, where the share is purportedly distribu· 
to him pursuant to the terms of a will which provides that he shall 
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Our conclusion is in accord with the rule followed in 
England (see, e.g, Brooke v. Lewis (V.C. 1822) 6 Madd.Ch. 
358, 56 Eng.Rep. 1128; In re lVilkins (1881) hR. 18 eh.Div. 
634; Re Arrowsmith (1860) 29 L.J.Ch. 774, 778; Note, 142 
A.L.R. 136, 148-150) and in other states (see, e.g., Forman Y. 
Brent, 309 Ky. 735, 739 [218 S.vV.2d 655] ; Will of Greene, 
240 Wis. 452, 463-464 [3 N.W.2d 704, 142 A.L.R. 129] ; Biles 
v. Webb, 118 Ohio St. 346, 355-357 [161 N.E. 49]). In re 
Estate of Jennrich, 197 Minn. 162 [266 N.W. 461, 267 N.\V. 
143], is not to the contrary, for in sustaining the gift to the 
alternative beneficiary the court explicitly noted that there 
was no evidence of dilatory administration by the executor 
and "nothing in the record indicating that the delay was not 
entirely in accordance with her [a beneficiary who died before 
distribution] desires." (In re Estate of J ennrich, supra, 197 
Minn. at p. 168.) 
[3] The Duerdens contend that since Ellen could have 
petitioned for a preliminary distribution during her life, 
delay in settling the estate cannot vest title in her. Ellen was 
under no obligation to petition for preliminary distribution, 
and there is "no principle which would create a forfeiture 
because of failure to take such legal action." (Forman v. 
Brent, supra, 309 Ky. at p. 739.) 
[2b] The Duerdens assert that even if the executor, 
Harold, should not take because of the delay, William should 
take one-half of Ellen's bequest. This contention is based on 
the erroneous assumption that the rule vesting Ellen's inter-
est is designed solely to prevent an executor from profiting by 
his own wrong. Ellen's conditional bequest vested at a time 
before her death, not because of the executor's wrong, but 
because that was the time when distribution should have 
occurred. 
We find no merit in the contention that our holding will 
lea.d to undesirable uncertainty in the settlement of estates. 
entitled to the same only in the event he survives the date of distribution, 
then such purported distribution as to him shall be void. This paragraph 
shall not apply in any ease where such heir, devisee or legatee dies before 
the decedent." This provision operates to render void distribution to a 
deceased person only when the gift to him fails because of his death prior 
to distribution. (See the history of section 1023 in Cont. Ed. Bar, 
Review of Selected 1955 Code Legislation 169, disclosing the procedural 
nature of the section.) In the present case, since distribution was un-
reasonably delayed, the gift to Ellen did not fail; for the same reason 
E8tate 01 Jameson, 93 Ca1.App.2d 35, 38-40 [208 P.2d 54]; Estate of 
Hampe, 85 Cal.App.2d 557, 558 [193 P.2d 133]; and Estate 01 Clarke, 
103 Cal.App. 243, 246 [284 P. 231], are inapplicable. 
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By its very nature a clause requiring survivorship to distribu-
tion creates uncertainty as to who will take until distribution 
is effected. Little or no detrimental uncertainty is added by 
requiring a determination as to when the estate should have 
been settled in cases that may arise in which a beneficiary dies 
during extended probate proceedings. 
[4&] On her cross-appeal Miss Cooney contends that the 
trial court erred in awarding $1,000 to Harold as executor and 
$1,000 to his attorneys as extraordinary fees.s [5] These 
awards must be upheld unless they so clearly appear to be 
out of proportion to the value of the services performed 88 
to establish. an abuse of discretion by the trial court. (See, 
e.g., Estate 01 Windiate, 197 Cal.App.2d 560, 566 [17 Cal. 
Rptr. 297].) [6] Moreover, delay in settling the estate is 
not a ground for denying fees otherwise justified by the 
services ,rendered. (Cf. Estate 01 Roberts, 27 Cal.2d 70, 76 
[162 P.2d 461],) [4b] It is undisputed that the executor 
and his attorney performed extraordinary services as defined 
in Probate Code section 902, and the record does not establish 
any abuse of discretion in fixing the fees for such service. 
The order is affirmed. Each party shall bear ,its own costs on 
I 
appeal. : 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, 
J., concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent and would reverse the order inso-
far as it decreed that Ellen'8 interest vested before her death 
and ordered distribution to the administratrix of her estate. 
Where a will provides that the interest of a beneficiary is 
contingent upon his surviving distribution, survivorship is a 
condition precedent to vesting and the beneficiary's interest 
fails if he dies prior to the making of an order of distribution. 
(Estate 01 Jameson, 93 Cal.App.2d 35, 38-40 [1] [208 P.2d 
54] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court]; Estate 01 
Hampe, 85 Cal.App.2d 557, 558 [1] [193 P.2d 133] [hearing 
denied by the Supreme Court].) 
Section 142 of the Probate Code provides: "A condition 
precedent in a will is one which is required to be fulfilled 
. before partiCUlar disposition takes effect. It is to be deemed 
performed when the testator's intention has been substan-
tially, though not literally, complied with. Nothing vests until 
lIn addition, each received statutory commissions of t1,848.47. 
such condition is fulfilled, except where fulfillment is impossi-
ble . ... " (Italics added.) 
In the instant case, fulfillment of the condition was not 
impossible. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, 
vesting had not occurred. 
The petition of the petitioners and appellants for a rehear-
ing was denied July 12, 1967, and the opinion was modified to 
read as printed above. 
